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Abstract
Nominal logic is a variant of first-order logic that provides support for reasoning about bound names
in abstract syntax. A key feature of nominal logic is the new-quantifier, which quantifies over fresh names
(names not appearing in any values considered so far). Previous attempts have been made to develop con-
venient rules for reasoning with the new-quantifier, but we argue that none of these attempts is completely
satisfactory.
In this article we develop a new sequent calculus for nominal logic in which the rules for the new-
quantifier are much simpler than in previous attempts. We also prove several structural and metatheo-
retic properties, including cut-elimination, consistency, and equivalence to Pitts’ axiomatization of nominal
logic.
1 Introduction
Nominal logic [15] is a variant of first-order logic with additional constructs for dealing with names and
binding (or name-abstraction) based on the primitive notions of bijective renaming (swapping) and name-
independence (freshness). It was introduced by Pitts [15] as a first-order and reasonably well-behaved frag-
ment of Fraenkel-Mostowski set theory, the setting for Gabbay and Pitts’ earlier foundational work on for-
malizing names, freshness, and binding using swapping [8].
One of the most interesting features of nominal logic is the presence of a novel form of quantification over
fresh names. The formula Na.ϕ means, intuitively, “for fresh names a, ϕ holds”. The intended semantics
of nominal logic interprets expressions as values in finitely-supported nominal sets, or sets acted upon by
name-swapping and such that each value depends on at most finitely many names. The inspiration for the
N-quantifier is the fact that in the presence of infinitely many names, a fresh name can be chosen for any
finitely-supported value, and equally-fresh names are indistinguishable. As a result, a property ϕ(a) holds
for some fresh name a if and only if it holds for all fresh names; in either case, we say that Na.ϕ holds.
Several formalizations of nominal logic have been investigated. Pitts introduced nominal logic as a
Hilbert-style axiomatic system. Gabbay [9] proposed Fresh Logic (FL), an intuitionistic Gentzen-style nat-
ural deduction system. Gabbay and Cheney [7] presented FLSeq, a sequent calculus version of Fresh Logic.
Scho¨pp and Stark have developed a dependent type theory of names and binding that contains nominal logic
as a special case [17].
However, none of these formalizations is ideal. Hilbert systems have well-known deficiencies for com-
puter science applications. FL and FLSeq rely on a complicated technical device called slices for the rules
involving N. Scho¨pp and Stark’s system is much more powerful than seems necessary for many applications
of nominal logic, and there are many unresolved issues, such as proof normalization and the decidability of
the equality and typechecking judgments.
In this article we present a new and simpler sequent calculus for nominal logic. Its main novelty is the
use of freshness information in typing contexts needed in reasoning about N-quantified formulas, rather than
the technically more cumbersome slices used in FL and FLSeq. We prove basic proof-theoretic results such
as cut-elimination, establishing that this calculus is proof-theoretically sensible. In addition, we prove that
NL⇒ is consistent and equivalent to Pitts’ original axiomatization of nominal logic.
This article incorporates some revised material from a previous conference publication [1], extended with
detailed proofs and additional results concerning conservativity. That paper also gave a sound and complete
embedding of Miller and Tiu’s FOλ∇ [13] in NL⇒, extending an earlier result by Gabbay and Cheney [7]
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Swapping
(CS1) ∀a:ν, x:τ. (a a) · x ≈ x
(CS2) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ. (a a′) · (a a′) · x ≈ x
(CS3) ∀a, a
′:ν. (a a′) · a ≈ a′
Equivariance
(CE1) ∀a, a
′:ν, b, b′:ν′, x:τ. (a a′) · (b b′) · x ≈ ((a a′) · b (a a′) · b′) · (a a′) · x
(CE2) ∀a, a
′:ν, b:ν′, x:τ. b # x ⊃ (a a′) · b # (a a′) · x
(CE3) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ. (a a′) · f(x) ≈ f((a a′) · x)
(CE4) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ . p(x) ⊃ p((a a′) · x)
(CE5) ∀b, b
′:ν′, a:ν, x:τ. (b b′) · (〈a〉x) ≈ 〈(b b′) · a〉((b b′) · x)
Freshness
(CF1) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ. a # x ∧ a′ # x ⊃ (a a′) · x ≈ x
(CF2) ∀a, a
′:ν. a # a′ ⇐⇒ a 6≈ a′
(CF3) ∀a:ν, a
′:ν′. a # a′
(CF4) ∀x:τ . ∃a:ν. a # x
N-quantifier
(CQ) ∀x.( Na:ν. ϕ) ⇐⇒ (∃a:ν. a # x ∧ ϕ)
where FV ( Na.ϕ) ⊆ {x}
Abstraction
(CA1)
∀a, a′:ν, x, x′:τ. 〈a〉x ≈ 〈a′〉x
′
⇐⇒ (a ≈ a′ ∧ x ≈ x′)
∨ (a′ # x ∧ x′ ≈ (a a′) · x)
(CA2) ∀y:〈ν〉τ .∃a:ν, x:τ. y ≈ 〈a〉x
Figure 1: Axioms of Classical Nominal Logic
which gave a sound, but nonconservative translation from FOλ∇ to FLSeq. These results are not presented
in this article.
2 Background
2.1 Pitts’ axiomatization
As presented by Pitts, nominal logic consists of typed first-order logic with equality and with a number of
special types, type constructors, and function and relation symbols formalized by a collection of axioms. In
particular, the basic sort symbols of nominal logic are divided into data types δ, δ′ and atom types ν, ν′ (which
we shall also preferentially call name types). In addition, whenever ν is a name type and τ is a type, there
exists another type 〈ν〉τ called the abstraction of τ by ν.
Besides possessing equality at every type, nominal logic includes a binary freshness relation symbol
freshντ : ν, τ → o for each name type ν and type τ . In addition, nominal logic includes two special function
symbols swapντ : ν, ν, τ → τ and absντ : ν, τ → 〈ν〉τ , called swapping and abstraction respectively. When
there is no risk of confusion, we abbreviate formulas of the form freshντ (a, t) as a # t, and terms of the
form swapντ (a, b, t) and absντ (a, t) as (a b) · t and 〈a〉t respectively. In addition, besides the ordinary ∀ and
∃ quantifiers, nominal logic possesses a third quantifier, called the fresh-name quantifier and written N. A
N-quantified formula Nx:ν.ϕ may be constructed for any name-type ν.
Pitts presented a Hilbert-style axiom system for nominal logic shown in Figure 1. The axioms are divided
into five groups:
• Swapping axioms (CS): describe the behavior of the swapping operation: swapping a name for itself
has no effect (CS1), swapping is involutive (CS2), and swapping exchanges names (CS3).
• Equivariance axioms (CE): prescribe the equivariance property, namely that all relations are preserved
by and all function symbols commute with swapping. In particular, (CE1) says that the swapping
function symbol itself is equivariant; (CE2) says that freshness is equivariant, (CE3) says that all other
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function symbols are equivariant, and (CE4) says that all other relation symbols are equivariant. Also,
(CE5) says that abstraction is equivariant.
• Freshness axioms (CF ): describe the behavior of the freshness relation (and its interaction with swap-
ping). (CF1) says that two names fresh for a value can be exchanged without affecting the value.
(CF2) says that freshness coincides with inequality for names. (CF3) says that distinct name-types
are disjoint. Finally, (CF4) expresses the freshness principle, namely, that for any finite collection of
values, a name fresh for all the values simultaneously may be chosen.
• N-quantifier axiom scheme (CQ): Pitts’ original formalization introduced no new inference rules for
N. Instead, Nwas defined using the axiom scheme Q, which asserts ∀x.( Na.ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃a.a # x ∧ ϕ),
where FV (ϕ) ⊆ {a, x}.
• Abstraction axioms (CA): These define special properties of the abstraction function symbol. Specif-
ically, (CA1) defines equality on abstractions as either structural equality or equality up to “safe”
renaming of bound names. Gabbay and Pitts showed that this generalizes α-equivalence in, for exam-
ple, the lambda-calculus [8]; we shall not repeat the argument here. Axiom (CA2) states a surjectivity
property for abstraction: any value of abstraction type 〈ν〉τ can be written as 〈a〉x for some name a : ν
and value x : τ .
2.2 Gentzen systems
While admirable from a reductionist point of view, Hilbert systems have well-known deficiencies: Hilbert-
style proofs can be highly nonintuitive and circuitous. Instead, Gentzen-style natural deduction and sequent
systems provide a more intuitive approach to formal reasoning in which logical connectives are explained
as proof-search operations. Gentzen systems are especially useful for computational applications, such as
automated deduction and logic programming. Such systems are also convenient for relating logics by proof-
theoretic translations.
Gentzen-style rules for Nhave been considered in previous work. Pitts [15] proposed sequent and natural
deduction rules for Nbased on the observation that
∀a:ν.(a # x ⊃ ϕ(a, x)) ⊃ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x) ⊃ ∃a:ν.(a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x)) .
These rules (see Figure 2(NL)) are symmetric, emphasizing N’s self-duality. However, they are not closed
under substitution, which complicates proofs of cut-elimination or proof-normalization properties.
Gabbay [9] introduced an intuitionistic natural deduction calculus called Fresh Logic (FL) and studied
semantic issues including soundness and completeness as well proving proof-normalization. Gabbay and
Cheney [7] presented a similar sequent calculus called FLSeq . Both FL and FLSeq had complex rules
for N. In FL, Gabbay introduced a technical device called slices for obtaining rules that are closed under
substitution. (For the purpose of this discussion, it is not necessary to go into the details of what slices
are, since we will show that we can do without them.) Technically, a slice ϕ[a#u] of a formula ϕ is a
decomposition of the formula as ϕ(a, x)[u/x] for fresh variables x, such that a does not appear in any of
the u. Slices were used in both FL and FLSeq to deal with N(see Figure 2(FL,FLSeq)). The slice-based
rules shown in Figure 2(FLSeq) are closed under substitution, so proving cut-elimination for these rules is
relatively straightforward once several technical lemmas involving slices have been proved. Noting that the
FLSeq rules are structurally similar to ∀L and ∃R, respectively, Gabbay and Cheney observed that alternate
rules in which NL was similar to ∃L and NR similar to ∀R were possible (see Figure 2(FL′Seq)). These rules
seem simpler and more deterministic; however, they still involve slices.
Experience gained in the process of implementing αProlog, a logic programming language based on
nominal logic [3], suggests a much simpler reading of Nas a proof-search operation than that implied by the
FL-style rules. In αProlog, when a N-quantifier is encountered (either in a goal or program clause), proof
search proceeds by generating a fresh name a to be used for the N-quantified name. Besides satisfying a
syntactic freshness requirement (like eigenvariables in ∀-introduction or ∃-elimination rules), the fresh name
is also required to be semantically fresh, that is, fresh for all values appearing in the derivation up to the
point at which it is generated. In contrast, the proof-search interpretation suggested by FL-style rules is to
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Γ, a # x⇒ ϕ,∆ (x = FV (Γ, Na.ϕ,∆))
Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ,∆ NR
Γ, a # x, ϕ⇒ ∆ (x = FV (Γ, Na:ν.ϕ,∆))
Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ∆ NL (NL)
Γ ⊢ u # t Γ ⊢ ϕ[a#t][u/a]
Γ ⊢ Na:ν.ϕ[a#t] NI
Γ ⊢ Na:ν.ϕ[a#t] Γ ⊢ u # t Γ, ϕ[u/a] ⊢ ψ
Γ⇒ ψ
NE
(FL)
Γ, u # t⇒ ϕ[u/a]
Γ, u # t⇒ Na:ν.ϕ[a#t] NR
Γ, u # t, ϕ[u/a]⇒ ψ
Γ, u # t, Na:ν.ϕ[a#t]⇒ ψ NL (FLSeq)
Γ, a # t⇒ ϕ (a 6∈ FV (Γ, ψ))
Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ[a#t] NR
Γ, a # t, ϕ⇒ ψ (a 6∈ FV (Γ, ψ))
Γ, Na:ν.ϕ[a#t]⇒ ψ NL (FL′Seq)
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ (a /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ NR
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ (a /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ψ NL (NL⇒)
Figure 2: Evolution of rules for N
search for a suitable slice of the N-quantified formula. This reading seems much less deterministic than that
employed in αProlog.
In this article we present a simplified sequent calculus for nominal logic, called NL⇒, in which slices
are not needed in the rules for N(or anywhere else). Following Urban, Pitts, and Gabbay [19, 9], and our
prior work [2], we employ a new syntactic class of name-symbols a, b, . . . different from ordinary variables
x, y, z, . . .. Like variables, such name-symbols may be bound (by N), but unlike variables, two distinct
name-symbols always denote distinct name values. As explained in our previous paper [2], name-symbols
can be used to construct ground terms, which is convenient form the perspective of studying Herbrand models
and consistency. In place of slices, we introduce contexts that encode information about freshness as well
as identifying the types of variables and name-symbols. Specifically, contexts Σ#a:ν may be formed by
adjoining a fresh name-symbol a which is also assumed to be semantically fresh for any value mentioned in
Σ. Our rules for N(Figure 2(NL⇒)) are in the spirit of the original rules and are very simple.
Besides presenting the sequent calculus and proving structural properties such as cut-elimination, we
verify that NL⇒ and Pitts’ axiomatization NL are equivalent. We also present a syntactic proof of the
consistency of the nonlogical rules, which together with cut-elimination implies consistency of the whole
system.
The structure of this article is as follows: Section 3 presents the sequent calculus NL⇒ along with
proofs of structural properties. Section 4 discusses several applications, including proofs of consistency and
equivalence of NL⇒ to NL. Section 5 concludes.
This article builds upon prior work by Gabbay and Cheney [7] and Gabbay [9], which introduced sequent
and natural-deduction calculi for nominal logic, based on slices. The closest-related prior publication is
Cheney [1], which introduced a single-conclusion, intuitionistic version of NL⇒ with the simpler rules for
N-quantifiers shown above. This article generalizes the approach taken there and provides detailed proofs of
the main results, along with proofs of new results including equivalence to classical nominal logic.
3 Sequent Calculus
3.1 Syntax
The types τ , terms t, and formulas ϕ of NL⇒ are generated by the following grammar:
τ, σ ::= δ | ν | 〈ν〉τ
t, u ::= x | a | c | f(t) ‖ (a b) · t | 〈a〉t
ϕ, ψ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | p(t) | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ ⊃ ψ | ∀x:τ.ϕ | ∃x:τ.ϕ | Na:ν.ϕ ‖ t ≈ u | t # u
The constructs to the right of ‖ are syntactic sugar that are definable in terms of the core language as explained
below; we list them in the grammar for ease of reference. The base types are datatypes δ and name-types ν;
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FV (x) = {x}
FV (a) = ∅
FV (Qx:σ.ϕ) = FV (ϕ)− {x} (Q ∈ {∀, ∃})
FV ( Na:ν.ϕ) = FV (ϕ)
FN(x) = ∅
FN(a) = {a}
FN(Qx:σ.ϕ) = FN(ϕ) (Q ∈ {∀, ∃})
FN( Na:ν.ϕ) = FN(ϕ)− {a}
Fα(c) = Fα(⊤) = Fα(⊥) = ∅
Fα(f(t)) = Fα(p(t)) =
⋃
Fα(ti)
Fα(ϕ ◦ ψ) = Fα(ϕ) ∪ Fα(ψ) (◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃})
Fα((a b) · t) = Fα(a) ∪ Fα(b) ∪ Fα(t)
Fα(〈a〉t) = Fα(a) ∪ Fα(t)
FV N(t) = FV (t) ∪ FN(t)
Figure 3: Free variables and names (note Fα stands for either FV or FN )
(a b) · ϕ = ϕ (ϕ ∈ {⊤,⊥})
(a b) · p(t) = p((a b) · t)
(a b) · ϕ ◦ ψ = (a b) · ϕ ◦ (a b) · ψ (◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃})
(a b) ·Qx:σ.ϕ = Qx:σ.(a b) · ϕ (Q ∈ {∀, ∃}, x /∈ FV (a) ∪ FV (b))
(a b) · Na:ν.ϕ = Na:ν.(a b) · ϕ (a /∈ FN(a) ∪ FN(b))
Figure 4: Swapping for formulas
additional types are formed using the abstraction type constructor. Terms are first-order, with variables x, y
are drawn from a countably infinite set V; also, name-symbols a, b are drawn from a countably infinite set
A disjoint form V. The letters a, b are typically used for terms of some name-type ν. Negation and logical
equivalence are defined as follows:
¬ϕ = (ϕ ⊃ ⊥) ϕ ⇐⇒ ψ = (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ)
We assume given a signature that maps constant symbols c to types δ, function symbols f to sorts
τ1, . . . , τn → δ, and relation symbols to sorts τ1, . . . , τn → o, and containing at least the following dec-
larations:
swapντ : ν, ν, τ → τ absντ : ν, τ → 〈ν〉τ
eqτ : τ, τ → o freshν,τ : ν, τ → o
for name-types ν and types τ . The subscripts are dropped when clear from context. The notations (a b) · t
and 〈t〉u are syntactic sugar for the terms swap(a, b, t) and abs(t, u), respectively. Likewise, t ≈ u and
t # u are syntactic sugar for eq(t, u) and fresh(t, u), respectively. The functions FV (·), FN(·), FV N(·)
calculate the sets of free variables, name-symbols, or both variables and name-symbols of a term or formula
(see Figure 3). We lift the swapping operation to formulas as shown in Figure 4.
The typing contexts used in NL⇒ are generated by the grammar:
Σ ::= · | Σ, x:τ | Σ#a:ν
We often write ·, x:τ and ·#a:ν to x:τ and a:ν respectively. We write ω for a term that may be either a
name-symbol a or a variable x. The Σ#a:ν binding indicates that a is a name of type ν and is assumed to be
fresh with respect to all names and variables in Σ. We write ω:τ ∈ Σ if the binding ω:τ is present in Σ. We
write Σ,Σ′ for the result of concatenating two contexts such that FV N(Σ) ∩ FV N(Σ′) = ∅.
We write Σ ⊢ t : τ or Σ ⊢ ϕ : o to indicate that t is a well-formed term of type τ or ϕ is a well-formed
formula. From the point of view of typechecking, the additional freshness information in the context is
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c : δ
Σ ⊢ c : δ
f : τ1, . . . , τn → δ Σ ⊢ ti : τi
Σ ⊢ f(t) : δ
ω : τ ∈ Σ
Σ ⊢ ω : τ Σ ⊢ ⊤ : o
Σ ⊢ ⊥ : o
Σ ⊢ ϕ, ψ : o (◦ ∈ {∧,∨,⊃})
Σ ⊢ ϕ ◦ ψ : o
Σ ⊢ a : ν Σ ⊢ t : τ
Σ ⊢ a # t : o
Σ ⊢ t, u : τ
Σ ⊢ t ≈ u : o
Σ, x:τ ⊢ ϕ : o
Σ ⊢ ∀x:τ.ϕ : o
Σ, x:τ ⊢ ϕ : o
Σ ⊢ ∃x:τ.ϕ : o
Σ#a:ν ⊢ ϕ : o
Σ ⊢ Na:ν.ϕ : o
Figure 5: Well-formedness rules
irrelevant. The rules for typechecking (shown in Figure 5) are standard, except for the rules for freshness and
the N-quantifier. Quantification using ∀ and ∃ is only allowed over types not mentioning o; N-quantification
is only allowed over name-types.
Definition 3.1. Let TmΣ = {t | Σ ⊢ t : τ} be the set of well-formed terms in context Σ.
• We associate a set of freshness formulas |Σ| to each context Σ as follows:
| · | = ∅ |Σ, x : τ | = |Σ| |Σ#a : ν| = |Σ| ∪ {a # t | t ∈ TmΣ}
For example, a # x, b # a and b # f(x, y) are in |x:τ#a:ν, y:σ#b:ν′|.
• We say that Σ′ is stronger than Σ (Σ ≤ Σ′) if TmΣ ⊆ TmΣ′ and |Σ| ⊆ |Σ′|. For example, a:ν, x:τ ≤
x:τ#a:ν, y:σ.
• We say that a:ν ∈ Σ if Σ = Σ′#a:ν,Σ′′ for some contexts Σ′,Σ′′ and similarly x:τ ∈ Σ means that
Σ = Σ′, x:τ,Σ′′ for some contexts Σ′,Σ′′.
• We say that a is fresh for Σ if a is not among the names appearing in Σ; we write a /∈ Σ to indicate that
this is the case. Similarly, we write x /∈ Σ to indicate that variable x does not appear in Σ.
The following routine properties hold:
Lemma 3.2 (Term Weakening). If Σ ⊢ t : τ and Σ ≤ Σ′ then Σ′ ⊢ t : τ .
Lemma 3.3 (Term Substitution). If Σ ⊢ t : τ and Σ, x:τ,Σ′ ⊢ u : τ ′ then Σ,Σ′ ⊢ u[t/x] : τ ′.
3.2 The Rules
Judgments are of the form Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆, where Σ is a typing context and Γ,∆ are multisets of formulas.
We define classical and intuitionistic versions of NL⇒. Classical NL⇒ is based on the classical sequent
calculus G3c (see Figure 6). The new rules defining NL⇒ are defined in Figures 7 and 8. NL⇒ includes
two additional logical rules, NL and NR, as already shown in Figure 2. In addition, NL⇒ includes several
new nonlogical rules defining the properties of swapping, equality, freshness and abstraction. (The standard
rules involving equality in Figure 6 are also considered nonlogical rules.)
Many of the nonlogical rules correspond to first-order universal axioms of nominal logic (Figure 7), which
may be incorporated into sequent systems in a uniform fashion using the Ax rule schema without affecting
cut-elimination [14]. Here, we write an axiom of the form P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pn ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qm as
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q.
To illustrate, the instances of this scheme for axioms F3 and F4 are:
Σ;Γ, a # a⇒ ∆
F3
Σ;Γ, a # b⇒ ∆ Σ;Γ, a ≈ b⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆
F4
The key point of this treatment of nonlogical rules is that they act only on the hypothesis set Γ, so they do not
introduce new principal cut cases in the proof of cut-elimination.
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Σ;Γ, p(t)⇒ p(t),∆
hyp
Σ;Γ⇒ ⊤,∆
⊤R
Σ;Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
⊥L
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Σ;Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
∧R
Σ;Γ, ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇒ ∆
∧L
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ1, ϕ2,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,∆
∨R
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆
∨L
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆
⊃R
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Σ;Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆
⊃L
Σ, x:σ; Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ (x 6∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ ∀x:σ.ϕ,∆
∀R
Σ ⊢ t : σ Σ;Γ, ∀x:σ.ϕ, ϕ{t/x} ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ∀x:σ.ϕ⇒ ∆
∀L
Σ ⊢ t : σ Σ;Γ⇒ ∃x:σ.ϕ, ϕ{t/x},∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∃x:σ.ϕ,∆
∃R
Σ, x:σ; Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ (x 6∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ, ∃x:σ.ϕ⇒ ∆
∃L
Σ;Γ, t ≈ t⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆
≈R
Σ;Γ, t ≈ u, P (t), P (u)⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, t ≈ u, P (t)⇒ ∆
≈S
Figure 6: Classical first-order equational sequent calculus (G3c)
The remaining nonlogical rules are as follows. Rule A2 expresses an invertibility property for abstrac-
tions: two abstractions are equal only if they are structurally equal or equal by virtue of A1. A3 says that
all values of abstraction type are formed using the abstraction function symbol. The F rule expresses the
freshness principle: that a name fresh for a given context may always be chosen. It is important to note that
the fresh name chosen in F may be of any name type ν, and thus, all name types are inhabited; however, base
data types δ could be empty, and an abstraction type 〈ν〉τ is inhabited if and only if τ is. Finally, the Σ# rule
allows freshness information to be extracted from the context Σ. It states that in context Σ, any constraint in
|Σ| is valid.
Remark 3.4. Although we have motivated some choices in NL⇒ in terms of proof-search behavior based on
experience with αProlog, some rules, such as A3 and Σ#, do not have particularly pleasant proof-search
properties. It is fair to say that NL⇒ addresses only the proof search complexity arising from the N-
quantifier and (to some extent) freshness but does not help very much with the complexity arising from
equational/freshness reasoning. In αProlog, special cases of these problems are dealt with using nominal
unification and freshness constraint solving; in this paper we aim to deal with full nominal logic.
The naming of the nonlogical rule groups corresponds to that used by Pitts: the axioms are divided into
groups for swapping (S), equivariance (E), freshness (F ), and abstraction (A). The (Q) axiom is replaced
by the logical rules NL and NR.
3.3 Structural Properties
Figure 9 lists some additional rules, including weakening, contraction, general form of hypothesis and equiv-
ariance rules, and cut. We will now prove their admissibility. Note that these rules are not part of the
definition of NL⇒, and so in proving admissibility, it suffices to consider only derivations using the core
rules introduced in Section 3.2.
We now list some routinely-verified syntactic properties of NL⇒. We write ⊢n J to indicate that judg-
ment J has a derivation of height at most n.
Lemma 3.5 (Weakening). If ⊢n Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable then so is ⊢n Σ;Γ, ϕ ⇒ ∆. Similarly, ⊢n Σ;Γ ⇒
∆, ϕ.
Lemma 3.6 (Context Weakening). If ⊢n Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ and Σ ≤ Σ′ then ⊢n Σ′; Γ⇒ ∆.
Lemma 3.7 (Substitution). If ⊢n Σ ⊢ t : τ and Σ, x:τ,Σ′; Γ⇒ ∆ then ⊢n Σ,Σ′; Γ[t/x]⇒ ∆[t/x].
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(S1) (a a) · x ≈ x
(S2) (a b) · (a b) · x ≈ x
(S3) (a b) · a ≈ b
(E1) (a b) · c ≈ c
(E2) (a b) · f(t) ≈ f((a b) · t)
(E3) p(t) ⊃ p((a b) · t)
(F1) a # x ∧ b # x ⊃ (a b) · x ≈ x
(F2) a # b (a : ν, b : ν
′, ν 6≡ ν′)
(F3) a # a ⊃ ⊥
(F4) a # b ∨ a ≈ b
(A1) a # y ∧ x ≈ (a b) · y ⊃ 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y
Figure 7: Equational and freshness axioms
Σ;Γ,
∧
P ,Q1 ⇒ ∆ · · · Σ;Γ,
∧
P ,Qn ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ,
∧
P ⇒ ∆
Ax
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q an axiom instance in Figure 7
Σ;Γ, 〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u, a ≈ b, t ≈ u⇒ ∆ Σ;Γ, 〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u, a # u, t ≈ (a b) · u⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, 〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u⇒ ∆
A2
Σ ⊢ t : 〈ν〉σ Σ, a:ν, x:σ; Γ, t ≈ 〈a〉x⇒ ∆ (a, x /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ ∆
A3
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆ (a /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ ∆
F
Σ;Γ, a # t⇒ ∆ (a # t ∈ |Σ|)
Σ; Γ⇒ ∆
Σ#
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ (a /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ,∆ NR
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ (a /∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ∆ NL
Figure 8: Nonlogical and N-quantifier rules
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
W
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ,∆
hyp∗
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Σ;Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆′
Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
cut
Σ;Γ, ϕ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
C
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
EV L
Σ;Γ⇒ (a b) · ϕ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
EV R
Figure 9: Some admissible rules of NL⇒
Proof. The interesting cases are for the new rules, specifically, nonlogical rules, NL, and NR. All of the
nonlogical rules are closed under substitution; in particular, for Σ# we have a # u ∈ |Σ, x,Σ′| then a #
u[t/x] ∈ |Σ,Σ′|.
For F we have a derivation
Σ, x:τ,Σ′#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆
Σ, x:τ,Σ′; Γ⇒ ∆
F
By induction we haveΣ,Σ′#a:ν; Γ[t/x]⇒ ∆[t/x], so we can use F again to deriveΣ,Σ′; Γ[t/x]⇒ ∆[t/x].
This requires the observation that since a /∈ Σ and Σ ⊢ t : τ , we must have a /∈ FN(t). The proofs
for NL and NR are similar, requiring the additional observation that ( Na:ν.ϕ)[t/x] = Na:ν.(ϕ[t/x]) since
a 6∈ FN(t).
The remaining structural transformations do not preserve the height of derivations. However, they do
preserve the logical height of the derivation, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3.8. The logical height of a derivation is the maximum number of logical rules in any branch of
the derivation. We write ⊢ln J to indicate that J has a derivation of logical height ≤ n.
Now we consider some structural properties specific to NL⇒. In the following, recall the definition of
(a b) · ϕ given in Figure 4.
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Lemma 3.9 (Admissibility of EV L, EV R). The EV L and EV R rules
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
EV L
Σ;Γ⇒ (a b) · ϕ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
EV R
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula in TmΣ, are admissible; if the antecedent of EV L or EV R is derivable,
then the respective conclusion has a derivation of the same logical height.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the lexicographic product of logical height and total height to show that
if the hypothesis of an instance of EV L or EV R has a derivation then the conclusion of the respective rule
has a derivation of the same logical height.
We first consider EV L. The only interesting cases are when (a b) · ϕ is principal on the left, otherwise
the induction step is straightforward. Furthermore, only the cases for hyp and ⊃L are nontrivial.
If the derivation is of the form
Σ;Γ, (a b) ·A⇒ (a b) ·A,∆
hyp
then we may derive Γ, A⇒ (a b) ·A,∆ as follows:
Σ;Γ, (a b) ·A⇒ (a b) ·A,∆
≈, hyp
Σ;Γ, A⇒ (a b) ·A,∆
E3
This derivation has the same logical height, 1, as the first.
If the derivation is of the form
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ ⊃ (a b) · ψ ⇒ (a b) · ϕ,∆ Σ;Γ, (a b) · ψ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ ⊃ (a b) · ψ ⇒ ∆
⊃L
then using the admissibility of EV R and EV L on the left and EV R on the right (on derivations of smaller
logical height) we obtain
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ ⊃ (a b) · ψ ⇒ (a b) · ϕ,∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ϕ,∆
EV L,EV R
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ψ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
EV L
Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆
⊃L
This transformation is obviously logical height-preserving by induction.
ForEV R, the interesting cases are those for hyp and⊃R where (a b)·ϕ is principal on the right. Suppose
the derivation is of the form
Σ;Γ, (a b) ·A⇒ (a b) ·A,∆
hyp
Then we can derive
Σ;Γ, (a b) · (a b) ·A⇒ A,∆
≈, hyp
Σ;Γ, (a b) ·A⇒ A,∆
E3
This derivation has the same logical height, 1, as the first.
If the derivation is of the form
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ⇒ (a b) · ψ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ (a b) · ϕ ⊃ (a b) · ψ,∆
⊃R
then sinceEV L andEV R are admissible for all subderivations of this derivation, by induction we can derive
Σ;Γ, (a b) · ϕ⇒ (a b) · ψ,∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ,∆
EV L,EV R
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆
⊃R
This transformation is obviously logical height-preserving by induction.
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Lemma 3.10 (Swapping Fresh Names). Suppose Σ#a:ν ⊢ ϕ(a) : o and b /∈ FN(Σ#a:ν). Then the rule
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b)⇒ ∆
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
is admissible using nonlogical axioms only.
Proof. Let x = FV (Σ). The derivation is as follows:
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, a # x, b # x, ϕ(b)⇒ ∆
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, a # x, b # x, (a b) · ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Ax
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, a # x, b # x, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
EV L
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Σ#
where F1 and equational reasoning is used repeatedly to show that (a b) · ϕ(a) ⊃ ϕ(b).
Lemma 3.11 (Admissibility of hyp∗). The hyp∗ rule
Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ,∆
hyp∗
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula in TmΣ, is admissible.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the construction of ϕ. The cases for the ordinary connectives of first-
order logic are standard. The case for ϕ = Na:ν.ϕ′ is as follows. By induction, we may assume that
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b)⇒ ϕ(b),∆ is derivable. We derive
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b)⇒ ϕ(b),∆
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ϕ(b),∆
Lemma 3.10
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ Na:ν.ϕ′,∆ NR
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ′ ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ′,∆ NL
Using the induction hypothesis, the judgment Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b) ⇒ ϕ(b),∆ is derivable, since it is an
instance of hyp∗ with a smaller principal formula.
Lemma 3.12 (Inversion). The ∧L, ∨L, ⊃L, ∃L, ∀R, NL, and NR rules are invertible; that is,
1. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆.
2. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ and ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆.
3. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆.
4. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ∃x.ϕ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ln Σ, y; Γ, ϕ[y/x]⇒ ∆.
5. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, ∀x.ϕ then ⊢ln Σ, y; Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[y/x].
6. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ln Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ for fresh a /∈ Σ.
7. If ⊢ln Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, Na:ν.ϕ then ⊢ln Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ for fresh a /∈ Σ.
Proof. The proofs for the rules∧L,∨L,⊃L, ∃L, ∀R are similar to those for the systems G3c andG3im [14].
For NL, the proof is by induction on the height of the derivation. Most cases are straightforward. Only
cases such as ∀R, ∃L,A3, F that introduce variables or name-symbols into Σ are exceptions. We show the
reasoning for ∀R.
If the derivation is of the form
Σ, x:τ ; Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ψ
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ∀x:τ.ψ
then using the induction hypothesis, we have Σ, x:τ#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b) ⇒ ψ. Using structural weakening we
have Σ#a:ν, x:τ#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(b) ⇒ ψ. Since a and b are fresh with respect to all terms in TmΣ, it is
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straightforward to show that Σ#a:ν, x:τ#b:ν : Γ, (a b) · ϕ(a) ⇒ ψ. Thus, by equivariance, we can de-
rive Σ#a:ν, x:τ#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a) ⇒ ψ. Now b is not mentioned in the sequent so using F we can derive
Σ#a:ν, x:τ ; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ψ, and using ∀R we can derive Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∀x:τ.ψ, as desired.
The proof for the invertibility of NR is symmetric.
Lemma 3.13 (Contraction). If ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ, ϕ ⇒ ∆ is derivable then so is ⊢ln Σ;Γ, ϕ ⇒ ∆. Similarly, if
⊢ln Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, ϕ is derivable then ⊢ln Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the lexicographic product of logical height and total height. That is, the
induction hypothesis applies to all derivations of smaller logical height and to all derivations of equal logical
height but smaller total height. Most cases are similar to any standard proof. The only new cases involve
nonlogical rules and Na:ν.ϕ. For the nonlogical rules it suffices to show that for each nonlogical rule that has
a contractable instance, there is a nonlogical rule corresponding to the contraction. The only such rule is F1.
If the derivation is of the form
Σ;Γ, a # x, a # x, (a a) · x ≈ x⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, a # x, a # x⇒ ∆
F1
then we can transform the derivation to
Σ;Γ, a # x, (a a) · x ≈ x⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, a # x⇒ ∆
S1
Most of the remaining cases are standard. The only interesting new case is when the contracted formula
is derived using NL:
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ(a), Nb:ν.ϕ(b)⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ(a), Nb:ν.ϕ(b)⇒ ∆ NL
Then using inversion we have ⊢ln−1 Σ#a:ν#b:ν : Γ, ϕ(a), ϕ(b) ⇒ ∆. Now using nonlogical rules we
can derive ⊢ln−1 Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a), ϕ(a) ⇒ ∆. Then using the induction hypothesis we have ⊢ln−1
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆. Finally we can derive
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ(a)⇒ ∆
F
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ(a)⇒ ∆ NL
The proof for right-contraction is symmetric, using the invertibility of NR.
3.4 Cut-Elimination
As usual for sequent systems, the most important property to check to verify that the system is sensible is
cut-elimination.
Lemma 3.14 (Admissibility of Cut). If ⊢ Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ and ⊢ Σ;Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆ then ⊢ Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′.
Proof. Following the proof of cut-elimination for similar systems such as G3c or G3im of [14], we prove
the lemma by induction on the structure of the cut-formula ϕ and then by a sub-induction on the sizes of
the subderivations Π of Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ and Π′ of Σ;Γ′, ϕ ⇒ ∆. Thus, for the induction hypothesis, we may
assume that the lemma holds for any instances with a less complex cut-formula or for all instances with the
same cut-formula but with a smaller derivation of one or the other of Π,Π′.
As in other proofs of cut-elimination for similar systems, there are four categories of cases:
• Base cases in which Π or Π′ is an axiom or initial sequent.
• Left-commuting cases in which Π starts with a rule in which ϕ is not principal.
• Right-commuting cases in which Π′ starts with a rule in which ϕ is not principal.
• Principal cases in which Π and Π′ both start with a rule in which ϕ is principal.
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All cases involving first-order rules exclusively are standard, and are shown in any standard proof of
cut-elimination (e.g. [14] or [18]); their proofs rely upon the properties established in the previous section,
including weakening, admissibility of hyp∗, contraction, and inversion. In addition, Negri and von Plato [14]
showed that nonlogical rules of the form we consider can be added to sequent systems like G3c or G3im
without damaging cut-elimination. Hence, it will suffice to consider only the new cases involving the N-
quantifier rules.
• Base cases: There are no new base cases.
• Left-commuting cases: There are two new cases in which Π begins with NR or NL.
In the first case, we have
Π
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ψ ⇒ ∆, ϕ NL
where a 6∈ Σ. We can weaken Π′ to obtain a derivation W (Π′) of Σ#a:ν; Γ′, ϕ ⇒ ∆′, and by
induction, we have Σ#a:ν; Γ, ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′. Then we may derive Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ using
NL.
In the second case, we have
Π
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, ϕ
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, Na:ν.ψ, ϕ NR
where a 6∈ Σ. We can weaken Π′ to get W (Π′) deriving Σ#a:ν; Γ′, ϕ ⇒ ∆′ and then by induction
obtain Σ#a:ν; Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′, ψ. Using NR we can derive Σ : Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′, Na:ν.ψ.
• Right-commuting cases. These cases are exactly symmetric to the left-commuting cases.
In the first case, we have
Π′
Σ#a:ν; Γ′, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆′
Σ;Γ′, ϕ, Na:ν.ψ ⇒ ∆′ NL
where a 6∈ Σ. We can weaken Π to obtain a derivation W (Π) of Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, and by induction,
we have Σ#a:ν; Γ, ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′. Then we may derive Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ using NL.
In the second case, we have
Π′
Σ#a:ν; Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆′, ψ
Σ;Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆′, Na:ν.ψ NR
where a 6∈ Σ. We can weaken Π to obtain a derivation W (Π) of Σ#a:ν; Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ and then by
induction obtain Σ#a:ν; Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′, ψ. Using NR we can derive Σ;Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′, Na:ν.ψ.
• Principal cases. In this case, both Π and Π′ decompose the cut formula. The only new rule for decom-
posing formulas on the right is NR, so the only new principal cut case is when we have
Π
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆, Na:ν.ϕ NR
Π′
Σ#a:ν; Γ′, ϕ⇒ ∆′
Σ;Γ′, Na:ν.ϕ⇒ ∆′ NL
for some a 6∈ Σ. By induction we haveΣ#a:ν; Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′, and we may concludeΣ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆,∆′
by an application of the freshness rule.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 3.15. Any derivable NL⇒ sequent has a cut-free derivation; there is an algorithm for producing
such derivations.
Proof. Proof by induction on the number of cuts. Given a derivation using cut, we can always find an
uppermost use of cut in the derivation tree and remove it. This reduces the number of cuts by one.
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Σ;Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ
Σ;Γ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆
⊃R
Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ϕ Σ;Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆
⊃L
Σ, x:σ; Γ⇒ ϕ (x 6∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ⇒ ∀x:σ.ϕ,∆
∀R
Σ ⊢ t : σ Σ;Γ, ∀x:σ.ϕ, ϕ{t/x} ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, ∀x:σ.ϕ⇒ ∆
∀L
Σ ⊢ t : σ Σ;Γ⇒ ∃x:σ.ϕ, ϕ{t/x},∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∃x:σ.ϕ,∆
∃R
Σ, x:σ; Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ (x 6∈ Σ)
Σ; Γ, ∃x:σ.ϕ⇒ ∆
∃L
Figure 10: Variant rules for the intuitionistic multiple-conclusion calculus (G3im)
3.5 Intuitionistic calculus
IntuitionisticNL⇒ (INL⇒) is based on the multiple-conclusion intuitionistic calculus G3im [14], in which
certain rules are restricted to discard alternative conclusions (see Figure 10). It is straightforward to show that
all of the structural properties including cut-elimination hold for INL⇒; the same arguments as given above
in the classical case apply. We will show in Section 4.3.2 that INL⇒ corresponds to a theory of first-order
intuitionistic logic that is equivalent to Pitts’ axiomatization in classical NL.
Theorem 3.16. In INL⇒, if Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ holds then there is a cut-free derivation of Σ;Γ⇒ ∆.
It is also straightforward to show that INL⇒ is equivalent to a single-conclusion intuitionistic calculus,
since the nonlogical and N-quantifier rules preserve the single-conclusion property.
Theorem 3.17. If Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ holds in INL⇒ then Σ;Γ ⇒ ∨∆ holds in the single-conclusion variant of
INL⇒.
Proof. Most cases of the proof are analogous to the usual proof relating G3i and G3im [14]. The additional
cases involve the nonlogical and N-quantifier rules. Of these, the nonlogical rules are straightforward because
nothing changes on the right-hand side of the sequent in these rules. The case for NL is also straightforward
for the same reason.
We show the case for NR. Suppose the derivation is of the form:
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Σ;Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ,∆ NR
By induction on the subderivation we know that Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ ∨
∨
∆. We reason as follows:
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ ∨
∨
∆
Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ[b/a]
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ NR
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ ∨
∨
∆
∨R1
Σ#a:ν; Γ,
∨
∆⇒
∨
∆
hyp∗
Σ#a:ν; Γ,
∨
∆⇒ Na:ν.ϕ ∨
∨
∆
∨R2
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ ∨
∨
∆⇒ Na:ν.ϕ ∨
∨
∆
∨L
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ ∨
∨
∆
cut
Σ;Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ ∨
∨
∆
F
We can use the intuitionistic (single-conclusion) variant of Lemma 3.10 to conclude Σ#a:ν#b:ν; Γ, ϕ ⇒
ϕ[b/a].
4 Applications
4.1 Syntactic Consistency
For pure first-order logic, cut-elimination immediately implies consistency, since by inspection of the rules
there can be no shortest proof of ·; · ⇒ ⊥. However, in the presence of general nonlogical rules, only a
weaker result holds. We say that an atomic formula is a constraint if it is an equality or freshness formula,
and Γ is a constraint set of it contains only constraints.
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Proposition 4.1. If ·; · ⇒ ⊥ has a cut-free derivation, then it has one using only nonlogical rules, in which
each sequent is of the form ·; Γ⇒ ⊥, where Γ is a constraint set.
The proof is immediate by observing that only nonlogical rules are applicable to a derivation of ·; Γ⇒ ⊥
where Γ is a constraint set. In particular, note that the instance of the Ax rule scheme for a # a ⊃ ⊥ (axiom
F3) has no hypotheses:
Σ;Γ, a # a⇒ ∆
F3
so it is not necessary to allow ⊥ as a constraint (though this would not do any harm either).
This means that nominal logic is consistent if and only if the nonlogical rules are consistent. We know
that classical nominal logic is consistent with respect to the semantics given by Pitts using nominal sets [15],
and we will show in the next section that the two systems are equivalent, however, here we would like to
give a direct syntactic proof that applies to both classical and intuitionistic variants of NL⇒. To prove the
consistency of the nonlogical rules, it is necessary to exhibit a model. We review how to define a Herbrand-
style semantics in terms of the syntax of nominal terms (see e.g. Cheney [2] for more details).
Definition 4.2 (Syntactic Swapping, Equality and Freshness). Let Tm be the set of swapping-free nominal
terms generated by the grammar
t ::= a | c | f(t) | 〈a〉t
We define the swapping function on such terms as follows:
(a b) · a = b
(a b) · b = a
(a b) · c = c (a, b 6= c)
(a b) · c = c
(a b) · f(t) = f((a b) · t)
(a b) · 〈c〉t = 〈(a b) · c, (a b) · t〉
We define the freshness relation on ground terms using the rules:
(a 6= b)
a # b a # c
a # t1 . . . a # tn
a # f(t) a # 〈a〉t
a # t (a 6= b)
a # 〈b〉t
The nominal equality relation is defined as follows:
a ≈ a c ≈ c
t1 ≈ u1 . . . tn ≈ un
f(t) ≈ f(u)
t ≈ u
〈a〉t ≈ 〈a〉u
t ≈ (a b) · u a # u (a 6= b)
〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u
The following properties of syntactic freshness and equality are a special case of more general properties
established elsewhere, e.g. by Urban et al. [19]:
Proposition 4.3. The nominal equality relation ≈ is an equivalence relation. Hence, NTm = Tm/≈ is
well-defined. Moreover, both ≈ and # are equivariant relations on Tm.
We now show how to interpret arbitrary nominal terms in NTm.
Definition 4.4. Let θ : V → NTm be a substitution of ground nominal terms for variables, called an
interpretation. We lift θ to a function from arbitrary terms to NTm as follows:
θ(a) = a
θ(c) = c
θ(f(t)) = f(θ(t1), . . . , θ(tn))
θ((a b) · t) = (θ(a) θ(b)) · θ(t)
θ(〈a〉t) = 〈θ(a)〉θ(t)
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We say that θ : FV (Σ) → NTm satisfies Σ (written θ : Σ) if θ(x) : Σ(x) for each x and a # θ(x) for
each constraint a # x ∈ |Σ|.
We write θ  t ≈ u or θ  a # t to indicate that θ(t) ≈ θ(u) or θ(a) # θ(t) respectively. Similarly,
θ  Γ indicates that θ  A for each constraint A in constraint set Γ. We say that a constraint A (or constraint
set Γ) is satisfiable if there is an interpretation θ : Σ such that θ  A (respectively, θ  Γ) holds in NTm.
Proposition 4.5. The axioms listed in Figure 7 are valid for NTm, in the sense that for each axiom ∧P ⊃∨
Q, if θ  ∧P then θ  Qi for some Qi ∈
∨
Q.
Proof. For S1 and S2, the proof is by induction on the definition of swapping for ground terms. The validity
of S3 is immediate.
For the equivariance axioms, the definition of swapping makes plain that abstraction and other function
symbols besides swapping itself are equivariant. In addition, it is not difficult to show that
(a a′) · (b b′) · x = ((a a′) · b (a a′) · b′) · (a a′) · x
that is, that the syntactic swapping function is equivariant. For the equivariance axioms for formulas, we only
need to consider E≈ and E#. But clearly equality is equivariant since
x ≈ y ⊃ (a b) · x ≈ (a b) · y
can be shown by induction on the derivation of x ≈ y; similarly,
a # x ⊃ (b b′) · a # (b b′) · x
can be shown valid by induction on the derivation of a # x.
For the axiom F1, we must show that if a # x and b # x then (a b) · x ≈ x. The proof is by induction
on the structure of x. For x = c the result is immediate; similarly, for x = f(yt the induction step is
straightforward. For x = c, we have a, b 6= c so (a b) · c = c ≈ c. For x = 〈c〉y, there are two cases. If
a, b 6= c then we have a, b # y and
(a b) · 〈c〉y = 〈(a b) · c〉(a b) · y ≈ 〈c〉y
since by induction (a b) · y ≈ y. Otherwise, without loss of generality suppose b = c (the case where a = c
is symmetric). We need to show that (a b) · 〈b〉y ≈ 〈b〉y, or equivalently that 〈a〉(a b) · y ≈ 〈b〉y. If a = b,
this is trivial. Otherwise, it is sufficient to show that (a b) · y ≈ (a b) · y (which is immediate) and a # y.
But since a # 〈b〉y and a 6= b, we know that a # y holds.
For F2, clearly any two name symbols a:ν and b:ν′ of different sorts are distinct, so a # b.
For F3, we need to show that a # a is not derivable. This is immediate from the definition of the freshness
relation.
For F4, we need to show that either a # b or a ≈ b is derivable. If a = b then a ≈ b is derivable;
otherwise a 6= b so a # b is derivable.
Finally, for A1 we need to show that if a # y and x ≈ (a b) · y then 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y. There are two cases. If
a 6= b then the last rule in the definition of nominal equality applies to show 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y. Otherwise, a = b
so x ≈ (a b) · y = y and so 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y.
Proposition 4.6. If θ  〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y then either θ  a ≈ b, x ≈ y or θ  a # y, x ≈ (a b) · y.
Proof. The proof is by case analysis of the possible derivations of θ(〈a〉x) ≈ θ(〈b〉y). There are only two
cases, corresponding to the last two rules in the definition of structural equality. The result is immediate.
Proposition 4.7. If θ : Σ then θ  a # t for each a # t ∈ |Σ|.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of t. The critical case is for t a variable; in this case, we
need to use the fact that θ : Σ only if a # θ(x) for each a # x ∈ |Σ|.
Theorem 4.8. Let Γ be a set of freshness and equality formulas. If Σ;Γ⇒ ⊥ is derivable then Γ is unsatis-
fiable.
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Proof. Proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation. Note that the only applicable rules are non-
logical rules. There is one case for each nonlogical rule. Most cases are straightforward. We present some
interesting cases.
All of the axioms in Figure 7 hold in NTm, by Proposition 4.5, so the cases in which these axioms are
used are straightforward. For example, for a derivation of the form
Σ;Γ, a # a⇒ ⊥
F3
clearly Γ, a # a is unsatisfiable.
For a derivation of the form
Σ;Γ, a # b⇒ ⊥ Σ;Γ, a ≈ b⇒ ⊥
Σ;Γ⇒ ⊥
F4
we have Γ, a ≈ b and Γ, a # b unsatisfiable. If θ : Σ then either θ(a) ≈ θ(b) or θ(a) 6= θ(b), in which case
θ(a) # θ(b). In either case, θ cannot satisfy Γ.
For a derivation ending with F ,
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ⊥
Σ;Γ⇒ ⊥
F
if θ : Σ, then without loss of generality we can assume a # θ so that θ : Σ#a:ν and so θ 6 Γ by induction.
For Σ#:
Σ;Γ, a # t⇒ ⊥ (a # t ∈ |Σ|)
Σ; Γ⇒ ⊥
Σ#
if θ : Σ then θ  a # t for any a # t ∈ |Σ|, by Proposition 4.7. Consequently θ 6 Γ.
For A2,
Σ;Γ, a ≈ b, x ≈ y ⇒ ⊥ Σ;Γ, a # y, x ≈ (a b) · y ⇒ ⊥
Σ;Γ, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y ⇒ ⊥
A2
suppose θ : Σ. By induction θ 6 Γ, a ≈ b, x ≈ y and θ 6 Γ, a # y, x ≈ (a b) · y. There are three cases. If
θ(a) ≈ θ(b) and θ(x) ≈ θ(y), then θ 6 Γ. Similarly, if θ(a) # θ(y) and θ(x) ≈ (θ(a) θ(b))·θ(y) then θ 6 Γ.
Otherwise, by the contrapositive of Proposition 4.6, θ 6 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y. In any case, θ 6 Γ, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y.
For A3,
Σ ⊢ t : 〈ν〉τ Σ, a:ν, x:τ ; Γ, t ≈ 〈a〉x⇒ ⊥
Σ;Γ⇒ ⊥
A3
if θ : Σ then θ(t) = 〈a〉v for some a : ν and t : τ , so let θ′ = θ[a 7→ a, x 7→ t]. Clearly θ′ : Σ, a:ν, x:τ and
θ′  t ≈ 〈a〉x so by induction θ′ 6 Γ. Since Γ does not mention a or x, we can conclude θ 6 Γ.
Corollary 4.9 (Syntactic consistency). There is no derivation of ·; · ⇒ ⊥.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.8, since ∅ is a satisfiable constraint set.
4.2 Orthogonality of abstraction
Using cut-elimination, we can also show that some parts of the equational theory are “orthogonal extensions”,
that is, derivable sequents not mentioning abstraction can be derived without using the special properties of
these symbols.
Theorem 4.10 (Conservativity). Suppose Σ has no variables mentioning abstraction and Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ and
Γ,∆ have no subterms of the form 〈a〉t. Then there is a derivation of Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ that does not use any
nonlogical rules involving abstraction.
Proof. We say that a context, formula, formula multiset, or sequent is abstraction-free if the abstraction func-
tion symbol and type constructor do not appear in it. A derivation is abstraction-free if the rules A1, A2, A3
do not appear in it. We write ⊢−A for abstraction-free derivability.
The proof is by induction on the structure of cut-free derivations. We need a stronger induction hypothesis.
We say Γ is good if abstraction is only mentioned in equations and freshness formulas. Note that if Σ is
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abstraction-free and there are no constants whose types mention abstraction then the only well-formed closed
terms of type 〈ν〉τ are of the form 〈a〉t. Hence, any equations among abstraction-typed terms are of the
form 〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u; we call such formulas abstraction equations. Any context can be partitioned into Γ,Γ′
such that Γ′ contains all the abstraction equations. We say that Γ′ is redundant relative to Γ if whenever
〈a〉t ≈ 〈b〉u ∈ Γ′, we have either ⊢−A Σ;Γ⇒ a ≈ b and t ≈ u or ⊢−A Σ;Γ⇒ a # u and t ≈ (a b) · u.
We will show that if Σ,∆ are abstraction-free and Γ,Γ′ is good and Γ′ is redundant relative to Γ, then if
⊢ Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆ then ⊢−A Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆. An abstraction-free Γ is obviously good and redundant relative to ∅,
so the main theorem is a special case.
The proof is by structural induction on the derivation. The cases involving left or right rules are straight-
forward because such rules act only on Γ and do not affect goodness and redundancy. The case for hyp is
easy since the hypothesis cannot be in Γ′.
For A1, we have
Σ;Γ, a # x, x ≈ (a b) · y,Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, a # x, x ≈ (a b) · y,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
A1
Clearly, Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y is redundant relative to Γ, a # x, x ≈ (a b) · y. Also, goodness is preserved. So by
induction we have Σ;Γ, a # x, x ≈ (a b) · y ⇒ ∆, as desired.
For A2, we have
Σ;Γ,Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y, a ≈ b, x ≈ y ⇒ ∆ Σ;Γ,Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y, a # y, x ≈ (a b) · y ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ,Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y ⇒ ∆
A2
Since Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y is redundant relative to Γ, there are two cases. If Σ;Γ ⇒ a ≈ b and x ≈ y, then
by induction we have a derivation of Σ;Γ, a ≈ b, x ≈ y ⇒ ∆, and using cut we can derive Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆
as desired. Otherwise, if Σ;Γ ⇒ a # y and x ≈ (a b) · y, then by induction we have a derivation of
Σ;Γ, a # y, x ≈ (a b) · y ⇒ ∆, and using cut we can derive Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ as desired. Cut-elimination does not
introduce uses of the abstraction rules, so the resulting derivations are abstraction-free.
For A3, we have
Σ ⊢ t : 〈ν〉τ Σ, a:ν, x:τ ; Γ, t ≈ 〈a〉x,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
A3
Since Σ has no variables of abstraction type, we must have t = 〈u〉v for some terms Σ ⊢ u : ν and Σ ⊢ v : τ .
Therefore, we can substitute into the derivation Σ, a:ν, x:τ ; Γ,Γ′, t ≈ 〈a〉x ⇒ ∆ to get Σ;Γ,Γ′, 〈u〉v ≈
〈u〉v ⇒ ∆. Clearly Σ;Γ ⇒ u ≈ u and v ≈ v, and Γ′, 〈u〉v ≈ 〈u〉v is redundant relative to Γ, so by
induction, we have a derivation of Σ;Γ⇒ ∆.
For the reflexivity rule ≈R, we have
Σ;Γ,Γ′, t ≈ t⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆
≈R
If t = 〈a〉x, then clearly Γ ⇒ a ≈ a and x ≈ x, so Γ′, 〈a〉x ≈ 〈a〉x is redundant relative to Γ, and we
have Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ by induction. Otherwise, Γ,Γ′, t ≈ t is obviously still good and Γ′ redundant with respect to
Γ, t ≈ t, so we can again conclude Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ by induction.
For ≈S-derivations, we have
Σ;Γ, t ≈ u, P (t), P (u)⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ,Γ′, t ≈ u, P (t)⇒ ∆
≈S
If P (u) is not an equation among abstraction-typed terms then the induction step is easy. There are many
cases depending on the structure of P (x), but in each case we can show that P (u) is also redundant relative
to Γ, t ≈ u (if t ≈ u is not an abstraction equation) or Γ (if t ≈ u is an abstraction equation).
The remaining nonlogical rules do not involve formulas of the form 〈a〉x ≈ 〈b〉y, so the induction step is
immediate for these rules.
17
4.3 Equivalence to Nominal Logic
In this section we discuss the relationship between the sequent calculi NL⇒ and INL⇒ and classical and
intuitionistic variants of Nominal Logic respectively. We aim to show that, modulo a straightforward syntactic
translation, formulas are provable in one system if an only if they are provable in the other. This in turn
suggests that they are equally expressive in a model-theoretic sense (provided models for NL⇒ are defined
in an appropriate way for its slightly different syntax, as done for example for FL [9]); however, in this article
we will not pursue the model theory of NL⇒.
4.3.1 Classical Nominal Logic
We first consider the classical case. We writeNL for the set of all axioms of Pitts’ axiomatization of nominal
logic, as reviewed in Section 2.1. For ordinary variable contexts Σ andNL-formula multisets Γ,∆, we write
⊢NL Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ to indicate that Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒G3c ∆ for some Γ′ ⊆ NL. Without loss of generality, a finite Γ′
can always be used. We write ⊢NL⇒ for derivability in NL⇒.
There is one technical point to address. Our system contains explicit name-constants quantified by Nand
appearing in typing contexts, whereas in Pitts’ system Nquantifies ordinary variables. To bridge this gap,
we translate NL formulas to NL⇒ formulas by replacing N-bound variables with fresh name-symbols. For
example, the NL formula Na:ν. Nb:ν′.p(a, b) translates to the NL⇒ formula Na:ν. Nb:ν′.p(a, b). We write
ϕ∗ for the translation of ϕ, which is defined as follows:
A∗ = A
⊥∗ = ⊥
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ ⊃ ψ∗
(∀x:τ.ϕ)∗ = ∀x:τ.ϕ∗
( Na:ν.ϕ)∗ = Na:ν.(ϕ∗[a/a]) (a = ι(a))
Technically, we translate sequents or derivation mentioning variables in V ∪ A′, to sequents or derivations
mentioning variables in V ∪ A′, where A′ is an isomorphic copy of the set of names A. We assume that
before translation, formulas are renamed so that N-bound variables are in A′, and we fix an isomorphism
ι : A′ → A. In what follows, we will sometimes leave ι implicit and assume that ι(a) = a whenever we
encounter a N-quantifier or context of the form Σ#a:ν.
The omitted cases for ⊤,∧,∨, ∃ are derivable via de Morgan identities. The translation of a judgment
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ is Σ;Γ∗ ⇒ ∆∗, where Γ∗,∆∗ is the result of translating each element of Γ,∆ respectively.
We first show that every theorem of NL translates to a theorem of NL⇒.
Theorem 4.11. If ⊢NL Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ then ⊢NL⇒ Σ;Γ∗ ⇒ ∆∗.
Proof. We defined ⊢NL Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ to mean ⊢G3c Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆ for some finite subset Γ′ ⊆ NL. Any
G3c derivation is an NL⇒ derivation, so we just need to show that in NL⇒, all of the uses of NL axioms
are redundant. We will show that each axiom ϕ ∈ NL is derivable in NL⇒. Thus, using cut finitely many
times, we can derive Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ in NL⇒.
For most of the axioms, this is straightforward. All of the axioms of the form ∀x.
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q are clearly
derivable from the corresponding nonlogical rules as follows:
x:τ ;P,Q1 ⇒
∨
Q · · · x:τ ;P ,Qn ⇒
∨
Q
x:τ ;P ⇒
∨
Q
Ax
x:τ ; · ⇒
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q
⊃R,∧R
·; · ⇒ ∀x:τ .
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q
∀R
with the topsequents all derivable using ∨R and hyp.
This leaves axioms not fitting this pattern, including (CF2), (CF4), (CA1), (CA2), and (CQ). (CA1)
and (CA2) can be derived using the nonlogical rules A1, A2, A3,≈S of NL⇒, and (CF2) using F3 and F4
of NL⇒. We will show the cases for (CF4) and both directions of (CQ) in detail.
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For an instance ∀x.∃a.a # x of CF4, the derivation is of the form
x:τ#a:ν : a # x⇒ a # x
x:τ#a:ν; · ⇒ ∃a:ν.a # x
∃R,Σ#
x:τ ; · ⇒ ∃a:ν.a # x
F
·; · ⇒ ∀x:τ .∃a:ν.a # x
∀R
For a translated instance of (CQ) of the form ∀x.( Na:ν.ϕ(a, x) ⇐⇒ ∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x)), we will
prove the two directions individually. For the forward direction, after some syntax-directed applications of
right-rules we have
x:τ#a:ν;ϕ(a, x), a # x⇒ a # x
hyp
x:τ#a:ν;ϕ(a, x)⇒ a # x
Σ#n
x:τ#a:ν;ϕ(a, x)⇒ ϕ(a, x)
x:τ#a:ν;ϕ(a, x)⇒ a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x)
∧R
x:τ ; Na:ν.ϕ(a, x)⇒ ∃a.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x) NL, ∃R
·; · ⇒ ∀x:τ.( Na:ν.ϕ(a, x) ⊃ ∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x)) ∀R
n,⊃R
For the reverse direction, we need to show ∀x.∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x) ⊃ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x).
x:τ , a:ν#b:ν;ϕ(b, x)⇒ ϕ(b, x)
x:τ, a:ν#b:ν; a # x, b # x, (a b) · ϕ(a, x)⇒ ϕ(b, x)
Ax∗
x:τ, a:ν#b:ν; a # x, ϕ(a, x)⇒ ϕ(b, x)
Σ#∗, EV L
x:τ , a:ν; a # x, ϕ(a, x)⇒ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x) NR
x:τ ; ∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x)⇒ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x) ∃L,∧L
·; · ⇒ ∀x:τ.(∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x) ⊃ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x)) ∀R,⊃R
Since both a and b are fresh for all the other free variables of ϕ, we have ϕ(a, x) ⇐⇒ ϕ((b a) · a, (b a) ·
x) ⇐⇒ ϕ(b, x) using equivariance and the fact that a # x ∧ b # x ⊃ (a b) · x ≈ x.
Consequently, all the translations of axioms of NL can be derived in NL⇒. As a result, if Γ′ ⊂ NL is
a finite set of axioms such that ⊢NL⇒ Σ;Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆, then using the derivations of the axioms and finitely
many instances of cut, we can obtain a derivation of ⊢NL⇒ Σ;Γ⇒ ∆.
Observe that this means that any closed theorem of NL can be derived in NL⇒. For example, from
Pitts [15, Prop. 3 and 4] we can show:
Proposition 4.12. • If FV (t) ⊆ x and FN(t) = ∅ then we can derive Σ;Γ ⇒ ∀a:ν.∀x:τ .a # x1 ∧
· · · ∧ a # xn ⊃ a # t.
• If FV (ϕ) ⊆ {a, x} then we can derive Σ;Γ⇒ ∃a:ν.a # x ∧ ϕ(a, x) ⇐⇒ ∀a:ν.a # x ⊃ ϕ(a, x)
Now we consider the converse: showing that there are no “new theorems”, that any NL sequent deriv-
able in NL⇒ is also derivable in NL. This is not as straightforward because subderivations of translated
NL judgments may involve name-symbols. However, we can show that such name-symbols can always be
removed.
We also introduce a converse translation mappingNL⇒ formulas to NL formulas:
A† = A
⊥† = ⊥
(ϕ ⊃ ψ)† = ϕ† ⊃ ψ†
(∀x:τ.ϕ)† = ∀x:τ.ϕ†
( Na:ν.ϕ)† = Na:ν.(ϕ†[a/a]) (ι(a) = a)
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Technically, we translate NL formulas over variables V to NL⇒ formulas over V ∪ A′, again using the
bijection ι between name-variables A′ and names in A. Note that (up to α-equivalence) the (−)∗-translation
and (−)†-translation are inverses. We also define the set ‖Σ‖ as follows:
‖Σ‖ = {a # x | ι(a) # x ∈ |Σ|} ∪ {a # b | ι(a) # ι(b) ∈ |Σ|}
that is, ‖Σ‖ is the finite subset of |Σ| consisting of constraints whose right-hand sides are variables or names,
but with names replaced by the corresponding name-variables according to the bijection ι.
We can now show the desired result.
Theorem 4.13. If Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in NL⇒ then Σ†; Γ†, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆† is derivable in NL.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the logical height of this derivation, with secondary induction on the total
height. For the cases corresponding to first-order/equational proof rules, the induction step is straightforward.
For the cases corresponding to nonlogical rules corresponding to universal axioms ∀x.
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q,
suppose that we have derivations of the form
Σ;Γ, P ,Q1 ⇒ ∆ Σ;Γ, P ,Qn ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, P ⇒ ∆
Ax
Then by induction, we haveNL derivations of theNL sequentsΣ†; Γ†, P ,Qi, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆† for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It is straightforward to show that each of the axioms in Figure 7 is provable in NL, hence we can cut against
each axiom instance:
Σ†; · ⇒ ∀x.
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q
Σ†; Γ†, P , ‖Σ‖ ⇒
∧
P
Σ†; Γ†, P ,Q1, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆
† · · · Σ†; Γ†, P ,Qn, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆
†
Σ†; Γ†, P ,
∨
Q, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
∨Ln
Σ†; Γ†, P ,
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
⊃L
Σ†; Γ†, P , ∀x.
∧
P ⊃
∨
Q, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
∀R
Σ†; Γ†, P , ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
cut
The cases for F3, F4, F, A2, A3,Σ#, NL, NR remain.
For F3, we have a derivation
Σ;Γ, a # a⇒ ∆
F3
In NL we can derive Σ†; Γ†, a # a, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆† using the a # b ⊃ a 6≈ b direction of (CF2) since a 6≈ a is
contradictory.
For F4, we have a derivation
Σ;Γ, a ≈ b⇒ ∆ Σ;Γ, a # b⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆
F4
By induction, we have derivations of Σ†; Γ†, a ≈ b, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆† and Σ†; Γ†, a # b, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†. Since
a # b ⇐⇒ a 6≈ b and a ≈ b ∨ a 6≈ b is a tautology in classical logic, a # b ∨ a 6≈ b is also a tautology. We
can cut against a derivation of this formula to derive Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ in NL.
For F , suppose we have a derivation of the form
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ⇒ ∆
F
By induction, we can derive the NL sequent Σ†, a:ν; Γ†, ‖Σ#a:ν‖ ⇒ ∆†. Note that ‖Σ#a:ν‖ = ‖Σ‖, a #
x where x = FV (Σ†). Using the freshness axiom (CF4) of NL, we can derive
Σ†; · ⇒ ∀x:τ .∃a:ν.a # x
Σ†, a:ν; Γ†, ‖Σ‖, a # x⇒ ∆†
Σ†; Γ†, ∀x.∃a:ν.a # x, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
∀L, ∃L
Σ†; Γ†, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†
cut
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It is likewise easy to derive rules A2, A3 from axioms (CA1), (CA2) of NL using cut.
For Σ#, suppose we have a derivation of the form:
Σ1#a:ν,Σ2; Γ, a # t⇒ ∆ (a # t ∈ |Σ1|)
Σ1#a:ν,Σ2; Γ⇒ ∆
Σ#
By induction, we have Σ†1, a:ν,Σ
†
2; Γ
†, a # t, ‖Σ1#a:ν,Σ2‖ ⇒ ∆
†
. Observe that a # x ⊆ ‖Σ1#a:ν,Σ2‖.
Using Proposition 4.12(1), we can derive as follows:
Σ†1, a:ν,Σ
†
2; · ⇒ ∀a:ν.∀x:τ .a # x ⊃ a # t
Σ†1, a:ν,Σ
†
2; Γ
†, ‖Σ1#a:ν,Σ2‖, a # t⇒ ∆
†
Σ†1, a:ν,Σ
†
2; Γ
†, ‖Σ1#a:ν,Σ2‖, ∀a:ν.∀x:τ .a # x ⊃ a # t⇒ ∆
†
∀L∗,⊃L∗
Σ†1, a:ν,Σ
†
2; Γ
†, ‖Σ1#a:ν,Σ2‖ ⇒ ∆
†
cut
Finally, we consider the cases for NL and NR. For NL, we have
Σ#a:ν; Γ, ϕ(a, x)⇒ ∆
Σ;Γ, Na:ν.ϕ(a, x)⇒ ∆ NL
From the upper derivation, by induction, we have a derivation of Σ†, a:ν; Γ†, ‖Σ#a:ν‖, ϕ†(a, x) ⇒ ∆†.
Since ‖Σ#a:ν‖ = ‖Σ‖, a # y where y = FV (Σ†) ⊇ x, we can also derive Σ†; Γ†, ‖Σ‖, ∃a:ν.a #
x ∧ ϕ(a, x) ⇒ ∆ using ∃L and ∀L. Finally, we can cut against the axiom instance ∀x:τ .∃a:ν.a # x ∧
ϕ†(a, x) ⇐⇒ Na:ν.ϕ†(a, x) to prove that Σ†; Γ†, Na:ν.ϕ†(a, x)⇒ ∆†.
For NR, we have
Σ#a:ν; Γ⇒ ϕ(a, x),∆
Σ;Γ⇒ Na:ν.ϕ(a, x),∆ NR
The argument is similar to the previous case: by induction, we can deriveΣ†, a:ν; Γ†, ‖Σ#a:ν‖ ⇒ ϕ†(a, x),∆†
inNL. Thus, since ‖Σ#a:ν‖ = ‖Σ‖, a # y where y = FV (Σ†), we can concludeΣ†; Γ†, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∀a:ν.a #
y ⊃ ϕ(a, x),∆†. Using Proposition 4.12(2) and the axiom (CQ) defining Nin NL we can cut against the
formula
∀y:τ .(∀a:ν.a # y ⊃ ϕ†(a, x)) ⇐⇒ Na:ν.ϕ†(a, x)
where y ⊇ x. We can conclude that Σ†; Γ†, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ ∆†, Na:ν.ϕ†(a, x).
Corollary 4.14. If Σ only contains variables and ⊢NL Σ;Γ∗ ⇒ ∆∗ then Σ;Γ⇒ ∆ is derivable in NL⇒.
Proof. By Theorem 4.13, we know that Σ†; (Γ∗)†, ‖Σ‖ ⇒ (∆∗)†. By definition of the (−)∗ and (−)†
translations, we know that (Γ∗)† = Γ and (∆∗)† = ∆. Moreover, since Σ contains no name-symbols, by
definition Σ† = Σ and ‖Σ‖ = ∅. Hence, Σ;Γ⇒ ∆.
4.3.2 Intuitionistic Nominal Logic
We wish to argue that the intuitionistic calculus INL⇒ is really “intuitionistic nominal logic”. However,
Pitts only considered classical nominal logic. There is a subtlety having to do with Pitts’ axiom (CF2) in the
intuitionistic case.
Pitts’ original axiom (CF2) stated that freshness among names is the same as inequality:
(CF2) ∀a, a
′:ν. a # a′ ⇐⇒ ¬(a ≈ a′)
However, this axiom does not fit the scheme for nonlogical rules given by Negri and von Plato [14]. Instead,
in INL⇒ we use two nonlogical rules F3 and F4 asserting that no name is fresh for itself and that two names
(of the same type) are either equal or fresh. These two axioms are equivalent to (CF2) in classical logic, but
in intuitionistic logic, Pitts’ axiom is weaker, since a ≈ b ∨ a 6≈ b does not follow from (CF2). (Recall that
for the F4 case of Theorem 4.13, we used excluded middle for name-equality).
We have modified Pitts’ axiomatization slightly by replacing the original axiom (CF2) with two rules,
(IF2) asserting that no name is fresh for itself, and (IF3) stating that two names are either fresh or equal.
In classical logic, these are equivalent axiomatizations, whereas (IF3) is not provable in intuitionistic logic
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Swapping
(IS1) ∀a:ν, x:τ. (a a) · x ≈ x
(IS2) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ. (a a′) · (a a′) · x ≈ x
(IS3) ∀a, a
′:ν. (a a′) · a ≈ a′
Equivariance
(IE1) ∀a, a
′:ν, b, b′:ν′, x:τ. (a a′) · (b b′) · x ≈ ((a a′) · b (a a′) · b′) · (a a′) · x
(IE2) ∀a, a
′:ν, b:ν′, x:τ. b # x ⊃ (a a′) · b # (a a′) · x
(IE3) ∀a, a
′:ν, x : τ. (a a′) · f(x) ≈ f((a a′) · x)
(IE4) ∀a, a
′:ν, x : τ . p(x) ⊃ p((a a′) · x)
(IE5) ∀b, b
′:ν′, a:ν, x:τ. (b b′) · (〈a〉x) ≈ 〈(b b′) · a〉((b b′) · x)
Freshness
(IF1) ∀a, a
′:ν, x:τ. a # x ∧ a′ # x ⊃ (a a′) · x ≈ x
(IF2) ∀a:ν. ¬(a # a)
(IF3) ∀a, a
′:ν. a # a′ ∨ a ≈ a′
(IF4) ∀a:ν, a
′:ν′. a # a′
(IF5) ∀x : τ . ∃a:ν. a # x
N-quantifier
(IQ) ∀x.( Na:ν. ϕ) ⇐⇒ (∃a:ν. a # x ∧ ϕ)
where FV ( Na.ϕ) ⊆ {x}
Abstraction
(IA1)
∀a, a′:ν, x, x′:τ. 〈a〉x ≈ 〈a′〉x
′
⇐⇒ (a ≈ a′ ∧ x ≈ x′)
∨ (a′ # x ∧ x′ ≈ (a a′) · x)
(IA2) ∀y : 〈ν〉τ .∃a:ν, x:τ. y ≈ 〈a〉x
Figure 11: Axioms of Intuitionistic Nominal Logic
from Pitts’ axioms. Moreover, it is computationally plausible that equality and freshness among names are
both decidable, since names are typically finite, discrete data structures.
For this reason, we introduce an alternative axiomatization INL, shown in Figure 11, differing in the
replacement of (CF2) with two axioms (IF2) and (IF3). These axioms are equivalent in classical logic to
(CF2), but better-behaved from a proof-theoretic perspective.
Let ⊢INL indicate derivability in intuitionistic logic from the axioms in INL. Using essentially the same
proof techniques as for the classical case, we have:
Theorem 4.15. If Σ contains only variables, then ⊢INL Σ;Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable if and only if ⊢INL⇒
Σ;Γ∗ ⇒ ∆∗.
5 Conclusions
Nominal logic provides powerful techniques for reasoning about fresh names and name-binding. One of the
most interesting features of nominal logic is the N-quantifier. However, the techniques used for reasoning
with Noffered by previous formalizations of nominal logic are highly (but unnecessarily) complex.
In this article we have introduced a new sequent calculus NL⇒ for nominal logic which uses typing
contexts extended with freshness information to deal with the N-quantifier. Its rules for Nare symmetric and
rationalize a proof-search semantics for Nthat seems natural and intuitive (inspired by the treatment of Nin
nominal logic programming). We proved cut-elimination in detail. In addition, we used NL⇒ to provide a
syntactic proof of consistency and a detailed proof of equivalence to Pitts’ axiomatization modulo ordinary
first-order (classical/intuitionistic) logic. These results are the first of their kind to be shown in detail.
NL⇒ has also been used in other work:
• NL⇒ provides a proof-search reading of Nwhich is much closer to the approach taken in the αPro-
log nominal logic programming language [3, 5]. While Gabbay and Cheney gave a proof-theoretic
semantics of nominal logic programming based on FLSeq, this analysis does not seem relevant to
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αProlog because it suggests a quite different (and, for typical programs, much more computationally
intensive) proof-search technique for N-quantified formulas. In contrast, NL⇒ seems to provide a
proof-theoretic foundation for αProlog’s existing search technique.
• Gabbay and Cheney [7] showed that FOλ∇, another logic due to Miller and Tiu [13] possessing
a self-dual “fresh value” quantifier, can be soundly interpreted in a higher-order variant of FLSeq
via a proof-theoretic translation. However, the translation they developed was incomplete, and the
possibility of finding a faithful translation was left open. Cheney [1] showed how to translate to a
higher-order variant of NL⇒ and proved a completeness result. In this paper we have focused on
NL⇒ only over first-order terms. It would be interesting to further explore NL⇒ over higher-order
terms and compare its expressiveness to more recent variations of Miller and Tiu’s approach, such as
the “nominal abstraction” system of Gacek et al. [10].
• Miculan, Scagnetto and Honsell [12] have shown how to translate derivable judgments from (a natural-
deduction variant of) NL⇒ to the Theory of Contexts [11], an extension of the Calculus of Induc-
tive Constructions with a theory axiomatizing a type of names with decidable equality, freshness, and
name-binding encoded as second-order function symbols. It may be interesting to consider the reverse
direction, e.g. translating a first-order fragment of the Theory of Contexts to nominal logic.
Additional directions for future work include the development of natural deduction calculi and type the-
ories using the ideas of NL⇒. One particularly interesting direction is the possibility of developing a type
system and confluent term rewriting system that could be used to decide equality of nominal terms and proof
terms. In such a system, the explicit equality and freshness theory that necessitates the many nonlogical
rules in NL⇒ could be dealt with implicitly via traditional rewriting and syntactic side-conditions, leading
to an even simpler proof theory for nominal logic. However, work in this direction by Scho¨pp and Stark [17]
indicates that there may be significant obstacles to this approach; the system introduced in this article may
be viewed as a well-behaved fragment of their system. Further development of the proof theory and type
theory of nominal logic (for example, building on nominal type theories by Pitts [16], Cheney [4], or Crole
and Nebel [6]) seems possible and desirable.
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